Sam Hinkie: Pure Genius, or Just Plain Crafty?

By Joe Darrah

It would be unwise to make a rush to judgment about the long-term expectations for the tactics of Sixers general manager/president Sam Hinkie in his short time here. But it’s become obvious that Hinkie is in no rush to make his club legitimately better anytime even remotely soon, and that’s become cause enough for concern because there’s no rational way of knowing — or even guessing — when his plan is supposed to come to fruition. This begs the question: How are we supposed to know whether Hinkie really knows how to put an NBA team together or if he only knows how to methodically take one apart?

At this point it will be years until we have a chance at an answer.

Given his reluctance to make any consistent public appearances other than the occasional conference call, such as he offered on Tuesday, and the local media’s general acceptance to grant him a Fortress of Privacy, there’s very little we really know about Hinkie and his real agenda. However, this much appears to be certain — dude is a modern-day Houdini of the NBA. His plan, his team is merely an illusion as of right now.

And I’m not quite sure how he’s done it, but he’s managed to take what had once been this city’s least attractive major sports team by all accounts and has by and large convinced the Philadelphia fanbase that it is now on an undeniable path to being freed from the chains that are the NBA’s purgatory of mediocrity by reducing it to utter, total garbage. It’s trash that will purposely persist to stink for what is now an undeterminable amount of time. If my calculations are correct (and they sometimes are), he’s got you, your neighbor and maybe even your sister convinced that there’s no way he won’t get the organization out of this disastrous state that it’s in despite his refusal to reveal how he’s going to do it and despite your reluctance to pay money to go into South Philly to watch his team.

The scariest thing is that Hinkie has produced no real evidence of being the effective basketball mastermind that he’s quickly become “known” to be in Philadelphia. At least, no evidence that has resulted in the formation of a franchise that can sustain a tradition of excellence or even making a team attractive enough to draw large crowds. He essentially escaped Houston when the Sixers hired him in May 2013. Up until that time the Rockets had not won more than 55 games in any one season during his time with them, they had placed higher than third in their own division just once, they had employed three different head coaches, did not get through the second round of the playoffs and consistently finished near the bottom third of the league in attendance numbers. Not only that, but after winning 55 games during the 2007-08 season Houston did not reach 50 wins again and mostly went through continued decline, even when taking into account the 2011 lockout.

The Rockets team that’s now considered a championship contender is not all his. The idea that he built that team is a bit of fallacy, frankly. He may have played a role in dismantling prior rosters and perhaps helping to secure the trade for James Harden in 2012, but he most certainly did not methodically build that team through the draft— as he appears to be trying to do here. In fact, one look at the transaction history during his nine years with Houston shows that the organization saw little success in the draft. More on this later.

Instead, let’s focus now on why, exactly, we should be so trusting. The truth is, there’s no good answer other than “just because.” As it stands, Hinkie’s previously purported three-year plan to build a contender has rather quickly become a plan that will take at least five years to “complete.” At least five years, that is. And while there’s really no sense in debating his worth as an executive until he ultimately succeeds or fails, what is debatable is how much time he should get to complete whatever grand scheme he has for this team (assuming he does indeed have one) and how patient this town should be in waiting for real proof of a pattern of winning.

Now, to be fair, it wasn’t that long ago that I was completely onboard with the direction Hinkie began taking. Though initially stunned that an incoming GM would make his first major move during his first draft the trading away of a young All Star point guard for a player with less than one year of college experience who had suffered an injury devastating enough to fall from the projected No. 1 overall pick to No. 6 in a reportedly weak class of 2013, my concerns were alleviated just one game into last season with the play of Michael Carter-Williams without even considering the inclusion of Nerlens Noel and the 2014 first-rounder as a part of the overall maneuver that sent Jrue Holiday to New Orleans.

But that draft pick was top-five protected, which in hindsight is really the impetus as to where concerns about Hinkie should stem. Every perceived step forward that he takes brings with it the potential for delay of assessing the true value of most of his moves.

Speaking specifically about building through the draft, Hinkie’s strategy during this past season to wait until the trade deadline to unload a large portion of the most talented players he inherited (namely Evan Turner and Spencer Hawes), thereby maximizing the Sixers chances to lose enough games to get into the 2014 Lottery but win enough so that the pick from the Pelicans did not fall into that top five protection, strengthened my original belief that he was on his way to delivering a quick fix that would turn the Sixers into legitimate contenders in a weak Eastern Conference.

But his actions a few months later during the actual 2014 draft seriously jeopardized my unjustified faith.

The drafting of yet another injured first-round selection with Joel Embiid this spring at No. 3 and using the 10th pick on Dario Saric, who at that time was known to be Turkey-bound and today is only eligible to join the Sixers after two seasons abroad, simply leaves more questions than answers about when Hinkie intends to really try to win basketball games.

A plan that once appeared to be defined by the purging of the 2013-14 roster while letting MCW get his feet wet and Noel heal so that a young nucleus — that until a short time ago also included Thad Young — made up exclusively of recent lottery-drafted players could take its lumps and form cohesion during 2014-15 and form an experienced squad in 2015-16 has already been vastly delayed.

As I write this column today following this week’s trade of Young, someone who’s surely, ahem, young enough and good enough to at least try to win games with MCW and Noel while gauging Embiid’s progress, the only thing we can be sure of what’s happening here is that Hinkie is prolonging his wait-and-see window to take the Sixers into relevancy, let alone championship contention.

In return for Young, who averaged 18 points and six rebounds per game last season as well as 2.1 steals (third in NBA), the 76ers received two players whose “value” begins and ends with their expiring contracts at the end of next season as well as a 2015 first-round draft pick (maybe, unless it lands within spots 1-10 during the next lottery).

Awesome. That means that possibly, perhaps, God willing, the Sixers will have a roster complete with players who they really intend to keep sometime while the sun still emits heat and light, depending on how long it takes Saric to sail the high seas into this country after his Turkish contract ends. Correct me if I’m wrong, but wasn’t the 2014 draft, Hinkie’s second with Philly, supposed to be the crown jewel of his maneuver to trade Holiday and engage Project Tanking? It’s tough to knock the Embiid selection this year with Andrew Wiggins and Jabari Parker going off the board, but to then treat the tenth pick as essentially meaningless by taking someone who you know has no way of helping your club until at least three seasons later is tough to justify.

This coming season, MCW will once again be operating and supposedly “growing” with a lineup that is not expected to be comparable to whom his teammates will be in 2015-16.

So what are we to expect? Should we assume that if Embiid does in fact prove to heal over the course of this season that the Sixers will actually use their next draft to develop a roster that is meant to be legit? Should we assume that the Sixers will dig deep into their pockets and be players in the 2015 free agency class? What is it that we should be judging Hinkie on, exactly? He has no real pedigree of success and has actually set a precedent of making moves in the name of the “future” without ever really having the present affected.

His philosophy is seemingly captured by that age-old riddle that asks: What’s always coming, but never arrives?

The answer, of course, is “tomorrow,” because by the time tomorrow gets here, it’s “today.”

If Hinkie continues to operate in the manner in which he has done, the “tomorrow” that is supposed to be Philadelphia’s basketball team that will challenge for Eastern Conference supremacy may never actually get here. At least, not while he’s here.

Joe Darrah is on staff at Philly Sports Jabronis.

Sam Hinkie’s Transaction Track Record

Sam Hinkie joined the Houston Rockets in 2005 as special assistant to the general manager and was promoted to vice president in 2007. His most significant move while there may have been the trading away of the best player drafted during his tenure, small forward Rudy Gay, who was shipped in 2006 to Memphis, where he would blossom into one of the game’s better young players, for a much older Shane Battier, who has had a nice NBA career, but experienced steady decline for four seasons before being traded back to Memphis for Hasheem Thabeet and a future first rounder. Yes, the same Thabeet who was reportedly acquired this week for the Sixers just to be released for a salary windfall.

Here’s a list of Hinkie’s and the Rockets’ drafted players from 2005-13 as well as mentions of notable trades. Notice the amount of trading that occurs for future compensation that is only sometimes secured. There are a few gems in here, but they’re not the standard. Also note where Hinkie’s promotion may not have taken place yet … and take his subjective level of influence for what it’s worth. Spoiler Alert: This is somewhat of a Da Vinci Code.

2005, Luther Head – first round, No. 24 overall, guard (played three seasons before being traded while Hinkie was assistant, career averages of 8.2 points and 2.1 assists per game).

2006, Rudy Gay – first round, No. 8, small forward (traded away before playing with team and before Hinkie’s promotion); Steve Novak – second round, No. 32, forward (played two seasons in Houston before being traded to the Clippers for a draft pick never used, career averages of 5.0 points and 1.4 rebounds).

2007, Aaron Brooks – first round, No. 26, point guard (played three seasons before being traded to Orlando for Goran Dragić and a draft pick, career averages of 11.1 points and 3.4 assists) & Brad Newley – second round, No. 54, small forward (played in summer league, then went to Greece).

2008, Nicolas Batum – first round, No. 25, small forward & Marty Leunen, second round, No. 54, power forward (neither played for Houston, part of a three-team trade that earned Rockets Donte Greene and a 2009 second round draft pick, Greene also never played for Rockets and was traded to Sacramento later that summer).

2009 – had no draft picks available, but did acquire the rights to three drafted players. Jermaine Taylor – second round, No. 32, shooting guard (played sparsely for parts of two seasons before being traded to Sacramento for a 2011 protected second rounder which was not earned); Sergio Llull – second round, No. 34, point guard (acquired for $2.25 million, reportedly making him the most expensive player ever to be purchased during the draft’s second round, never played NBA game and instead had short career in Spain); Chase Budinger, second round, No. 44, small forward (played five NBA seasons, never averaged more than 9.8 points or 3.7 rebounds, traded to Minnesota after three years in Houston for 2012 first rounder).

2010, Patrick Patterson – first round, No. 14, power forward (started seven games over two seasons in Houston; was traded to Sacramento in 2012-13 with Toney Douglas and Cole Aldrich in exchange for Thomas Robinson, Francisco García and Tyler Honeycutt; career averages of 8.4 points and 4.6 rebounds).

2011, Marcus Morris – first round, No. 14, forward (played 17 games as a rookie, traded the following season for a 2013 second rounder that was used after Hinkie joined Sixers); Nikola Mirotic – first round, No. 23, power forward (never played in Houston; traded with Brad Miller, Chandler Parsons and a 2013 first rounder to Minnesota for Jonny Flynn, Donatas Motiejunas and a 2012 second rounder; currently member of Bulls, but no NBA experience); Chandler Parsons – second round, No. 38, small forward (was member of aforementioned trade, but was reacquired for cash; has played three productive years in NBA, all with Rockets, but not resigned as free agent after Hinkie’s departure and has joined Dallas).

2012, Jeremy Lamb – first round, No. 12, guard/forward (never played in Houston; was traded during offseason to Oklahoma City Thunder as part of the Rich Harden deal that also cost the Rockets Kevin Martin, a 2013 first rounder, future first rounder and future second rounder with Cole Aldrich, Daequan Cook, and Lazar Hayward arriving with Harden); Royce White – first round, No. 16, power forward (diagnosed with mental health condition, not retained by Houston, played one NBA game with Sacramento in 2013-14); Terrence Jones – first round, No. 18, power forward (has been a productive player in his first two seasons, averaging 10.8 points and 6.2 rebounds per game overall).

Notable Trades and Signings:

July 12, 2007 – Traded Vassilis Spanoulis and a 2009 second rounder (Nando De Colo was later selected) to the San Antonio Spurs for Jackie Butler and Luis Scola.

Aug. 14, 2008 – Traded Donte Greene, Bobby Jackson and a 2009 first rounder (Omri Casspi was later selected) to the Sacramento Kings for Metta World Peace, Patrick Ewing and Sean Singletary.

Dec. 23, 2008 – Traded Steve Francis, cash and a 2009 second rounder (Sam Young was later selected) to the Memphis Grizzlies for a 2011 second rounder. Houston did not receive the 2nd round draft pick because it was top 55 protected.

Feb. 19, 2009 – As part of a three-team trade, the Houston Rockets traded Rafer Alston to the Orlando Magic; the Memphis Grizzlies traded Kyle Lowry to the Houston Rockets; the Orlando Magic traded Brian Cook to the Houston Rockets; and the Orlando Magic traded Adonal Foyle, Mike Wilks and a 2009 first rounder (DeMarre Carroll was later selected) to the Memphis Grizzlies.

July 8, 2009 – Signed Trevor Ariza as a free agent.

August 11, 2010 – As part of a four-team trade, the Houston Rockets traded Trevor Ariza to the New Orleans Hornets; the Indiana Pacers traded Troy Murphy to the New Jersey Nets; the New Jersey Nets traded Courtney Lee to the Houston Rockets; and the New Orleans Hornets traded Darren Collison and James Posey to the Indiana Pacers.

Dec. 15, 2010 – Traded Jermaine Taylor and cash to the Sacramento Kings for a 2011 second rounder. Houston did not receive the pick because it was top-55 protected.

Feb. 24, 2011 – Traded Shane Battier and Ishmael Smith to the Memphis Grizzlies for DeMarre Carroll, Hasheem Thabeet and a future first rounder.

June 23, 2011 – Traded cash to the Minnesota Timberwolves for Chandler Parsons.

Dec. 12, 2011 – Signed Jeremy Lin as a free agent.

Dec. 24, 2011 – Signed Samuel Dalembert as a free agent.

July 24, 2012 – Signed Omer Asik as a free agent.

Oct. 27, 2012 – Traded Jeremy Lamb, Kevin Martin, a 2013 first rounder (Steven Adams was later selected), a future first rounder and a future second rounder to the Oklahoma City Thunder for Cole Aldrich, Daequan Cook, James Harden and Lazar Hayward.